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A Socialised Conceptualisation of Individual Privacy: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Notion of the ‘Public’ in 
UK MoPI Cases 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article seeks to conceptualise a more public, a more socialised notion of 
privacy in contrast to the archetype: that my privacy is of interest and of value 
only to me. Doing so has historically left a claim to privacy rather exposed against 
claims to free speech, with the latter’s long pedigree and generally acknowledged 
wider instrumental role. This article provides a corrective. In the first part, it offers 
a typology of rationales at one of two meta-levels: privacy as a means to effect 
assurance or privacy as a means to protect someone’s activities. The second 
discusses the results of some small-scale empirical doctrinal research: a sample 
analysis of 27 UK privacy cases looking to identify the judicial ascription of the 
value of privacy, specifically trying to discover whether there was any judicial 
conceptualising of privacy as having a more social, or public, value or utility. The 
results are perhaps not unexpected. Almost exclusively, judges frame their 
rationales for protecting privacy in purely individualised terms. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The mantra of hi-tech company The Circle, in Dave Eggars’ novel of the same 
name, is that  
 Secrets are Lies 
   Sharing is Caring 
 Privacy is Theft1 
This emerges out of a staged Q & A led by one of its founders as part of a public 
relations exercise seeking to reclaim the democratic value of transparency: 
lawmakers and officials who have something to hide – that is, lawmakers and 
officials who refuse to wear The Circle’s all-seeing SeeChange camera that offers 
constant public surveillance of their activities – are suspicious. A little later there 
is a serious suggestion that all citizens be required to have a Circle account – 																																																								David	Mead,	Professor	of	UK	Human	Rights	Law,	UEA	Law	School.		Address	for	correspondence:	Law	School,	 Earlham	Hall,	 University	 of	 East	 Anglia,	 Norwich	NR4	 7TJ	 d.mead@uea.ac.uk.	 Thanks	 to	 all	those	who	 have	 read	 or	 heard	 the	 paper	 before:	 the	 SLS	Media	 section,	 Oxford	 2017;	 UEA	 faculty	seminar;	Dr	Karen	Mc	Cullagh	and	Dr	Paul	Wragg	and	the	anonymous	referee.	All	errors	and	views	mine.		1	D	Eggars,	The	Circle	(McSweeny’s,	2013)	303.	
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which includes a voting app – as a means of securing 100% democratic 
participation, an obviously Good Thing. Literature has a long history of dystopias 
along those or similar lines – and some foresee real life following a similar 
trajectory. Eggars wants us to baulk at these suggestions, and to jolt ourselves 
awake – we should indeed be wary given the almost imperceptible 
incrementalism involved in a project such as The Circle’s. We do so because we 
value privacy – our own privacy. We do not see it as serving instrumental goals, 
even if they might be as socially beneficial as The Circle is trying to claim (but 
which readers of course doubt).  
 
This article seeks to provide a corrective to both those last contentions. While we 
each might value our own privacy, and indeed may well value it highly, that 
leaves claims to an individualised right of privacy rather exposed against claims 
to a socialised right of free speech, with its long pedigree and generally 
acknowledged wider instrumental role. This is problematic. It has the effect of 
setting privacy up to fail, in a battle where the odds are stacked against it. The 
protection of privacy is generally – or mostly – conceived as an individualised 
right, of use and value to each of us but not something in which anyone else has 
any (justifiable) interest. This article therefore considers this simple, alternative 
question: what interest(s) if any might I have in your privacy?  
 
The article is in three main parts. The first sets out what we might call the 
traditional debate. It notes the public utility of free speech and the individualised 
nature of justifications for protecting privacy. The second then offers a typology of 
rationales that we might pray in aid were we to seek to construct a more 
socialised notion of privacy, that is privacy with social value or utility. Whilst in 
general that sites our debate around privacy’s common value, using Priscilla 
Regan’s three-fold categorisation2, we will also consider elements of what she 
termed privacy’s public value, instrumentally pertaining to the civic, democratic 
and political sphere (and the opposite of the private realm of family, home and 
workplace). The last part of this article provides the results of some small-scale 
																																																								2	P	 Regan,	 Legislating	 Privacy:	 Technology,	 Social	 Values	 and	 Public	 Policy	 (University	 of	 North	Carolina	Press	1995)	221.	
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empirical doctrinal research.3 I conducted a sample analysis of 27 UK privacy 
cases looking to identify the judicial ascription of the value of privacy, specifically 
trying to discover whether there was any judicial conceptualising of privacy as 
having a more social, or public, value or utility.4 The results are perhaps not 
unexpected. Almost exclusively, judges frame their rationales for protecting 
privacy in purely individualised terms. 
 
Before embarking any further, I need to offer some clarifications on terminology 
and scope. The term ‘private life’ is not being used in contradistinction to the 
‘public sphere’ 5 , with the former suggesting areas of intimate or personal 
decision-making, free from governmental (or similar) interference and constraint.6 
Secondly, the focus of this article is informational privacy, not (in Anita Allen’s 
words) decisional privacy, or ‘privacy as autonomy’ or ‘privacy as seclusion’ – the 
seminal right to be left alone. Even then, the context is media reporting. Digital 
privacy and state surveillance is outside its parameters save only for any 
coincidental overlap. Its focus is thus on claims arising from misuse of private 
information (MOPI): who is able to find out information about me, what 
information and on what terms? It is what Daniel Solove terms information 
dissemination, the third of his four harmful activities that implicate privacy.7 Lastly, 
for our purposes, we do not need to avail ourselves of the finer discussions about 
whether privacy even in this sense is about (in)accessibility (as Ruth Gavison 
would maintain8) or about determining control (as Alan Westin argues).9  
 																																																								3	To	that	extent,	this	builds	on	and	expands	the	project	undertaken	by	Kirsty	Hughes	on	Article	8	case	law	more	widely	 and	 generally	 at	 Strasbourg	 level:	 see	K	Hughes,	 ‘The	 Social	 Value	 of	 Privacy,	 the	Value	 of	 Privacy	 to	 Society,	 and	Human	Rights	Discourse’	 in	B	Roessler	 and	D	Mokrokinska,	Social	
Dimensions	of	Privacy:	Interdisciplinary	Perspectives	(CUP	2015).	4	The	methodology	is	set	out	in	more	detail	on	p.xx	but	in	short,	a	Westlaw	search	of	UK	cases,	decided	between	1	January	1990	and	1	November	2016	(the	date	of	the	search),	was	carried	out	using	two	search	terms	privacy/media	(214	cases)	narrowed	to	45	using	privacy	/10	media	/10	injunction	of	which	27	(60%)	were	selected	for	analysis.	5	On	which	the	starting	point	remains	J	Habermas,	The	Structural	Transformation	of	the	Public	Sphere:	
An	Inquiry	into	a	category	of	Bourgeois	Society	(MIT	Press	1991).	6	A	Allen,	‘Taking	Liberties:	Privacy,	Private	Choice,	And	Social	Contract	Theory’	(1987)	56	U	Cin	L	Rev	461,	463-4.	7	D	Solove,	‘A	Taxonomy	of	Privacy’	(2005-6)	154	U	Pa	L	Rev	477,	489.	8	R	 Gavison,	 	 ‘Privacy	 and	 the	 Limits	 of	 the	 Law’	 (1980)	 89	 Yale	 Law	 Journal	 421,	 423:	 ‘in	 perfect	privacy	 no	 one	 has	 any	 information	 about	 X,	 no	 one	 pays	 attention	 to	 X,	 and	 no	 one	 has	 physical	access	to	X....’	ibid,	428.			9	A	Westin,	Privacy	and	Freedom	(Atheneum	1967)	7.	
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II.  THE PARADIGMATIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Traditionally viewed, privacy is important for individuals while free speech has 
wider, social functions. It is well established and unassailable that my privacy is of 
enormous benefit and value to me. Historically, privacy has been seen as being 
about harm to dignity, dating back to the original legal articulation in the late 
1800s by Warren and Brandeis10, and to autonomy: dignity because publishing 
stories about my private life treats me as a means (to the publisher’s profits and 
its readers’ enjoyment) not as an end in myself – and autonomy, since it removes 
my right either to choose to release information about myself or to retain control 
such that information that I had not chosen to release or information over which I 
had asserted control (or over which I had limited the release, in terms of audience 
or details) becomes known. We see this realised in Campbell, with Lord Hoffman 
asserting that ‘what human rights law has done is to identify private information 
as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity.’11 
Lord Nicholls put it like this: a  ‘proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-
being and development of an individual.’12 Protecting privacy also assists us in 
maintaining our self-esteem and securing personal dominium.13 In his dissent in 
Wood, Laws LJ speaks of individual’s personal autonomy making him ‘master of 
all those facts about his own identity such as name, health, ethnicity, his own 
image.’14 
 
While this connotes privacy as something both intrinsically and instrumentally 
valuable15 – in that protecting privacy allows us to flourish and feel better about 
ourselves knowing we have the sanctuary of secrecy – none of this conceives of 
private information as something in which you or anyone else would and should 
properly have any interest. Indeed, in their analysis of Warren and Brandeis’s 																																																								10	S	Warren	&	L	Brandeis,	‘The	Right	to	Privacy’	(1890)	4	Harv	L	Rev	193.	11	Campbell	v	MGN	[2004]	UKHL	22,	[2004]	2	AC	457	[50].	12	Ibid	[12].	13	Ibid	[56]	(Lord	Hoffman).	14	Wood	v	Commissioner	of	Police	for	the	Metropolis	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	414,	[2009]	4	All	ER	951	[21].	15	We	 might	 even	 consider	 those	 non-consequentialist	 justifications	 as	 being	 both	 individual	 or	collectivist	 –	 the	 latter	 that	 they	 speak	 to	 shared	 human	 traits,	 such	 as	 empathy	 or	 in	 the	 Judeo-Christian	tradition	‘Judge	not,	that	ye	be	not	judged’	(Matthew	7:1).	
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articulation, Neil Richards and Daniel Solove make that very point. ‘Their central 
phrase to describe the right to privacy--the right to be let alone--emphasizes the 
isolated individual and her ability to shut out invaders.’16 The contrast with free 
speech is immediately and obviously instructive.	 Most obvious in this context 
would be the role that it plays within a political democracy – aiding the 
development of an informed electorate and self-governing citizenry, the view 
advanced by Alexander Meiklejohn17, or acting as a brake on power.18 This idea 
of truth as disinfectant best reflects the fictional urging of politicians to wear The 
Circle’s SeeChange device. Alternatively, freedom of expression might bring 
about the social good of (better) truth in the market place of ideas. As Justice 
Holmes put it in his dissent in Abrams ‘the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’19 Free speech 
might also be imbued with the quality of ‘social glue’, drawing on Joseph Raz’s 
idea about the validating function of public portrayals of lifestyles.20 They not only 
‘serve to reassure those whose ways of life are being portrayed that they are not 
alone’ but ‘they serve to familiarize the public at large with ways of life common in 
certain segments of the public’. Such portrayals, made real by the guarantee of 
free speech, thus serve a social function, that of community cohesion, perhaps 
not dissimilar to Lee Bollinger’s notion of free speech inculcating reciprocal 
tolerance.21 
 
Each is now simply accepted judicially and theoretically as orthodoxy – 
justification for the claim that free speech does indeed promote social harmony or 
does lead to falsity being hounded out of the market is never sought. Constructed 
thus – if privacy is something ‘simply’ of value only to me, as the means to effect 
my autonomy and guarantee my dignity – one does not have to be a utilitarian to 
recognise the difficulty that faces anyone seeking to prevent the media claiming 																																																								16	N	Richards	and	D	Solove,	 ‘Privacy's	Other	Path:	Recovering	The	Law	Of	Confidentiality’	(2007)	96	Geo	LJ	123,	173.	17	A	Meiklejohn,	Political	Freedom:	The	Constitutional	Powers	of	the	People	(HarperCollins	1960).	18	Free	speech	‘is	a	safety	valve:	people	are	more	ready	to	accept	decisions	that	go	against	them	if	they	can	in	principle	seek	to	influence	them.	It	acts	as	a	brake	on	the	abuse	of	power	by	public	officials.	It	facilitates	the	exposure	of	errors	 in	the	governance	and	administration	of	 justice	of	the	country’	R	v	
Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	ex	p	Simms	[2000]	2	AC	115,	126	(Lord	Steyn).	19	Abrams	v	United	States	(1919)	250	US	616,	630.	20	J	Raz,	‘Free	Expression	and	Personal	Identification’	(1991)	OJLS	303,	311.	21	L	Bollinger,	The	Tolerant	Society:	Freedom	of	Speech	and	Extremist	Speech	in	America	(OUP	1988).	
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to be entitled to publish material about them. If however, we reconfigure privacy 
as something valued for its social utility – for the role it may play more widely, for 
the enhancements and benefits it can offer each of us collectively – then the 
relationship alters dramatically. It is to that we now turn. 
 
 
III.  THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF PRIVACY 
 
This part of the article both draws on earlier theoretical accounts, bringing them 
together and developing them, and provides further rationales to demonstrate that 
we each of us have – or potentially have – a mutual interest in one another’s 
private information. It does so by offering a new typology. It also seeks to situate 
those earlier analyses, which – and especially recently – have generally been 
located in discussions about a different aspect of privacy, that of freedom from 
surveillance. This part places those insights within a framework that relates to 
privacy against media intrusion. When, in this piece, there is talk of privacy or of 
privacy being protected, this is at an abstracted general level. It does not mean or 
does not assume – in doctrinal terms – that on any given facts, privacy has been 
and will be protected by, say, an injunction; in other words, that in the ultimate 
balancing test, Article 8 has come out on top over Article 10. 
 
Within that, we can identify at least two different types of the wider social interest. 
The first is where B (and maybe C and D) – that is a minor, identifiable class – 
has a parasitic interest in the privacy of A, to whom they have some connection, 
but which is an interest that is different from A’s individual autonomy- or dignity-
based interest in her own privacy. The other is where we all can be said to have a 
mutual interest in A’s privacy – though again A’s interests and ours are founded 
on different rationales. An example of the former is the point made in Campbell by 
Lord Carswell when he asserted that it was not simply the model herself who 
stood to gain from continued secrecy of the location of the Narcotics Anonymous 
meetings & the details of the treatment. Publication might ‘inhibit other persons 
attending the course from staying with it, when they might be concerned that their 
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participation might become public knowledge.’ 22  Similarly, in ETK there was 
discussion of the gains for the children of those in the public eye not being 
exposed to playground ridicule.23 While those examples provide some support for 
a wider conception of privacy, this article maintains that they are different from – 
and lesser than – any general interest that unconcerned, disinterested citizens 
have in my continued privacy. It is those latter that will provide the surer footing 
for a social conception of privacy. It is those wider justifications that are our focus. 
 
A number of different social conceptions of privacy will be discussed below. Not 
every one has the same obvious and immediate underpinning to the archetype 
factual matrix in a MOPI claim. For several – such as those termed meritocratic 
privacy or insulating privacy – the relationship with a classic MOPI claim is 
reasonably clear. At first sight though, for several more the relationship seems 
more tenuous. It is harder to see how, for example, what I term cohesive privacy, 
which we turn to first, can play a role in a media intrusion case. However, if we 
conceive of a MOPI claim as not solely being about preventing disclosure of 
moral or legal wrongdoing – even though many obviously are – but also having 
the objective of evading unwanted and unsought attention – and cases such as 
DMK, Mills, Weller, T v BBC, Murray and GreenCorns all fit that latter mould – it 
becomes much easier to see how each of the various dozen or so conceptions 
might support that.24 
 
While all the various rationales outlined below serve instrumental functions, we 
might better typify them as working at one of two meta-levels: effecting assurance 
or protecting activity.25 We mean by the former that the very act of protecting A’s 
privacy per se has social significance, irrespective of whatever it is that A is said 
to have done. There is a gain for X Y and Z etc simply from knowing that A’s 
privacy in the abstract is or will be protected. Alternatively, social utility might 
accrue precisely because A’s conduct – the specific details of what she has done 
																																																								22	Campbell	(n11)	at	[165].	23	ETK	v	NewsGroup	Ltd	[2011]	EWCA	Civ	439,	[2011]	WLR	1827	[17].	24	This	point	came	up	in	private	correspondence	with	Paul	Wragg	and	made	me	think	much	more	clearly	about	what	it	is	I	am	laying	claim	to.	25	This	idea	was	generated	by	thinking	about	the	divide	between	class	and	contents	in	public	interest	immunity	claims.	
	 8	
or said – remains private to her alone.  This is what is meant by protecting activity 
as being socially valuable. 
 
 
Effecting assurance as social utility 
 
Perhaps at its simplest, if your privacy is protected, that tells me that mine will be. 
If yours is not, why should I suppose that mine will be? More widely, if your 
privacy is protected, that tells me that we both live in a rights-protecting society, 
and that we each, and all, of us has a stake in that shared endeavour. Privacy 
rules thus act as socio-political signifiers, offering us all the collective security of 
the individualised focus of a liberal democracy.26 In doing so, they evince a 
commitment to cohesive privacy. This is something we can derive from Robert 
Post’s analysis. Rules on privacy guarantee socially appropriate behaviour, 
vouchsafing ‘the forms of respect that [we are] entitled to receive from 
others…[and] safeguarding rules of civility and the chain of ceremony’. 27 
Publication of private material is then a form of collective attack on those shared 
norms. Indeed, as he notes, we cannot see a MOPI action as seeking to maintain 
the secrecy of private facts – since it cannot and does not. We are better to 
understand it ‘as a means of obtaining vindication for the infringement of 
information preserves [that means the claimant] is ultimately reintegrated into that 
chain of ceremony which defines and embraces members of the community’.28 
Rules that mean we are unable to pry into our neighbour’s affairs – literal or 
figurative – in one sense are thus both the cost, as well as the benefit, of one 
form of political organisation. In Rawlsian terms, we might see rules that 
guarantee privacy as the price we pay to reduce the strains of commitment, 
something that encourages us all to ‘buy’ into the social contract.29 We might term 
this co-optive privacy.  
 
																																																								26	This	has	echoes	of	much	wider	debates	in	human	rights	discourse	about	the	collective	or	social	role	of	individual	rights:	I’m	grateful	to	Michael	Hamilton	for	that	observation.	27	R	Post,	 ‘The	social	foundations	of	privacy:	community	and	self	in	the	common	law	tort’	(1989)	77	Cal	L	Rev	957,	967-968.	28	Ibid,	986.	29	J	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	(Belknap	Press	1971).	
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A guarantee of privacy simpliciter – that is, aside from any shroud it offers to the 
private activity – performs a normative structuralising function, what we might 
consider to be norm-inculcating privacy. Rules assuring us that our privacy will 
be protected very clearly set out public limitations on the actions of third parties, 
whether governmental and other private actors. The very act of hiving off aspects 
of one’s existence – and denoting them as private, as beyond the reach of any 
other – is itself thus a socially significant act. This is the sense in which Priscilla 
Regan sees privacy. 30  For Paul Schwartz, the delineation of (informational) 
spheres and thus of aspects of our lives in turn leads to the creation of very clear 
public and private domains, with the former essential to the political.31 The notion 
that life comprises different spheres of operation is meaningful in and of itself. Of 
course, the ideological construction of a liberal secluded space is very much, or 
can very much be seen, as contestable. It might not be well known but there is no 
formal guarantee of privacy in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(the Banjul Charter) of 1981 – though, as its name suggests, includes various 
collective rights, in Articles 19-24 – perhaps reflecting the (South) African notion 
of ubuntu, common or shared humanity.32 Indeed, arguing for privacy to have a 
particular politically normative utility does not predict – and is not necessarily 
predicated on – a particular certain organising social form. We shall see below 
that we might conceive of privacy creating what Fried calls the ‘necessary 
atmosphere’ 33  for trust to flourish and thus capable of founding reciprocal 
relationships at the heart of a more collective form of political organisation. It is an 
irony perhaps that protecting individual privacy might furnish stronger collective 
ties. 
 
It is then but a small step to thinking about constitutive privacy, the idea put 
forward by both Paul Schwartz and Julie Cohen that a guarantee of individual 																																																								30	Regan	(n2)	221-230.	31	P	 Schwarz,	 ‘Privacy	 and	 Democracy	 in	 Cyberspace’	 (1999)	 52	 Vand	 L	 Rev	 1609	 (‘Privacy	 and	Democracy’).	32	Similarly,	the	emergence	of	a	cultural	concept	of	privacy	in	China	is	only	a	recent	development:	The	
Economist,	 ‘The	 long	 march	 to	 privacy’,	 12	 January	 2006	 (available	 here	http://www.economist.com/node/5389362)	which	piece	starts	‘it	is	surely	telling	that	the	characters	that	make	up	yinsi,	the	Chinese	word	for	‘privacy’,	carry	the	connotations	of	illicit	secrets	and	selfish,	conspiratorial	 behaviour.’	 The	 suggestion	 is	 that	 attitudes	 toward	 privacy	 were	 shaped	 largely	 by	traditional	living	arrangements.	I	am	grateful	to	Karen	McCullagh	for	this.	33	C	Fried,	‘Privacy’	(1968)	77	Yale	LJ	475,	478.	
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privacy provides the foundations for a mutual (and reflexive) shaping of society 
and its underlying values.34 How might it do so? Schwartz explains. A proper 
‘democracy requires more than group deliberation at a town square located either 
in Real Space or in cyberspace. It requires individuals with an underlying capacity 
to form and act on their notions of the good in deciding how to live their lives.’35 
That, in turn, requires ‘boundaries about personal information to help the 
individual and define terms of life within the community’.36 We need to live our 
lives in both the private and public sphere, with symbiosis between the two. In the 
private, hived-off realm, we construct our notion of the good life – and then seek 
to give effect to it in the public realm…as of course does everyone else. 
Struggling to realise those aspirations, what Julie Cohen termed ‘critical 
citizenship’ – in communion with some, in opposition to others – gives necessary 
vitality to the public sphere, avoiding what she terms a ‘modulated democracy’.37 
In a similar vein, Ruth Gavison has written how, in fostering autonomy, privacy 
supports democratic self-government in that autonomous decision-making by 
citizens is a condition of such a political form.38 Priscilla Regan speaks of privacy 
as facilitating the creation of multiple personas (something we consider below).39 
This in turn has a socially instrumental value. We place in the background and in 
private those aspects that separate us from others allowing us in the public, civic 
realm to foreground that which unites us – rather than being constantly driven 
apart by public differences – thus confirming our equal status as citizens. 40 
 
Another means by which privacy-protection rules provide a social surety function 
is one we might term meritocratic privacy – the assurance we all have, as I put 
it in an earlier piece, ‘that those seeking appointment to public positions will not 
be deterred from putting themselves forward solely because of the fear the media 																																																								34	The	idea	of	‘constitutive	privacy’	is	raised	in	P	Schwartz,	‘Privacy	and	Democracy’	(n31)	1658	and	developed	in	P	Schwartz,	 ‘Internet	Privacy	and	the	State’	(2000)	32	Conn	L	Rev	815	and	in	J	Cohen,	‘What	is	Privacy	for?’	(2013)	126	Harv	L	Rev	1904.	35	Schwartz,	‘Privacy	and	Democracy’	(n31)	1654.	36	Ibid	1664.	37	Cohen	(n34).	38	Gavison	(n8)	455.	39	Regan	(n2).	40	Though	as	Julie	Bailey	notes,	‘an	account	of	privacy	that	valorizes	it	as	a	vehicle	for	social	peace	by	concealing	 differences’	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 long	 term	 vehicle	 for	 substantive	 equality,	 another	 valid	social	good:	J	Bailey,	‘Towards	an	Equality-Enhancing	Conception	of	Privacy’	(2008)	31	Dalhousie	LJ	267,	292.	
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will hang out their dirty linen, their minor transgressions, daily on the front 
pages’.41 While there is a clear benefit to individuals who will not need to deny 
themselves opportunities simply because they do not feel ‘better able to cope with 
life in the spotlight and the media glare or who [do not] feel that they have nothing 
to hide’42, there is a clear public or collective interest.43 It cannot be a positive 
thing to place political, sporting, cultural, and business appointments out of reach 
of those who have disqualified themselves on grounds of previous indiscretion or, 
in the case of someone like Lord Browne, because they would prefer not to open 
aspects of their private life to scrutiny.44 We are all able to take comfort from the 
fact that appointments and promotions are deserved and given, all things being 
equal, to the best candidates.  
 
Protecting activity as social utility 
 
While the protection of privacy per se is capable of effecting several useful social 
benefits, the fact that privacy protection rules shroud specific conduct is also able 
to serve a host of wider socially instrumental functions. 
 
First, let us consider Neil Richards’ ideas about intellectual privacy, developed 
in the context of surveillance, both state and from powerful private actors such as 
Google and Facebook.45 He has argued that privacy and free speech are not in 
opposition; instead we should view their relationship as symbiotic and supportive. 
Privacy – that is insulation from surveillance – is needed to shield our intellectual 
activities and our thinking from public gaze. Freedom to speak implies we have 
something worth saying – so we need time in private to marshal and develop our 
thoughts. Richards provides us with only a starting block. While he does not 																																																								41	D	Mead,	‘It's	a	funny	old	game	-	privacy,	football	and	the	public	interest’	[2006]	EHRLR	531,	550.	42	Ibid.	43	Looked	at	 in	purely	economic	 terms,	 the	allocative	efficiency	of	 this	might	go	 some	way	 towards	stemming	 the	 supposed	 distributive	 inequalities	 identified	 by	 Lior	 Strahilewitz	 that	 flow	 from	 the	more	privacy-protective	European	environment	benefitting	‘elites	at	the	expense	of	the	masses’:	see	L	Strahilewitz,	 	 ‘Towards	a	Positive	Theory	of	Privacy	Law’	(2013)	126	Harv	L	Rev	2010,	2015	et	seq.	Two	consequences	are	said	to	flow:	‘First,	authorized	celebrity	gossip	will	form	a	higher	percentage	of	published	 celebrity	 ‘news.’	 Second,	 elites	 will	 retain	 privileged	 access	 to	 true	 information	 about	celebrities	via	their	social	networks.’	(ibid,	2017).	44	Lord	Browne	of	Madingley	v		Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	295,	[2008]	1	QB	103.	45	N	Richards,	 ‘Intellectual	 Privacy’	 (2008)	 87	Texas	 Law	Review	387	 and	 Intellectual	Privacy	(OUP	2015).	
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explicitly seek to construct a social model of privacy along lines being developed 
here – that is, that we all gain from A’s privacy being protected – it is probably 
safe to assume it is implied: ‘If we are interested in a free and robust public 
debate we must safeguard its wellspring of private intellectual activity.’46 The 
public gains to freedom of speech that spring from individual privacy are 
recognised. There is recognition of this in domestic case-law. In John Terry, 
Tugendhat J made that same point: ‘Article 8 even promoted freedom of speech 
as well as of conduct since speech can only be conducted freely if the parties are 
in private’.47 Where Richards’ argument is more suspect is his exclusive focus on 
what we might best typify as internal cognitive privacy.48 Indeed the type of MOPI 
claims that are our concern are, in his view, outwith the need for amplified 
protection:  
 
To be sure, some kinds of privacy claims—like the paradigmatic 
Warren and Brandeis claim against the press based upon hurt 
feelings—do threaten First Amendment values, in this case the need 
to protect the institution of the press so that it can provide information 
of public concern.49 
 
That may well be true but is far too narrow a formulation. There are two points to 
make. Whilst it is hard to imagine a case where, if the press is prevented from 
publishing private information (or even, simply, seeking to gather it), that could not 
be said to have constrained (in US terms) the First Amendment rights of the press, 
does it follow then that public discourse more widely is impoverished? As we shall 
see, being able to protect private information from public disclosure allows 
individual flourishing to which we can quite properly attribute speech gains, either 
through wider or ‘better’ speech. One would be Richards’ own case that ideas are 
properly thought through before being expressed. Another would be the idea that 
anonymity – on the internet but we could think of it more generally – allows us to 
hear views from certain marginalised or insecure groups otherwise denied us: 
whistleblowers and victims of abuse would be two that spring to mind. Secondly, 																																																								46	Richards,	‘Intellectual	Privacy’	(2008)	(n45),	391.	47	John	Terry	(formerly	LNS)	v	Persons	Unknown	[2010]	EWHC	119	(QB)	[98].	48	He	refers	to	‘cognitive	processes’:	Richards,	‘Intellectual	Privacy’	(2008)	(n45)	391.	49	Ibid,	407.	
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even if it we were to accept the case that privacy against media intrusion reduces 
our collective enjoyment of freedom of expression by limiting freedom of the press, 
that does not mean that preventing the public disclosure of private information 
cannot make more secure or more effective the exercise of other rights by others. 
We might term this facilitative privacy. Privacy not only allows each of us 
individually, and then collectively, fuller exercise of the rights of free speech and of 
thoughts and belief (if we accept the first counter above), but it also allows a fuller 
exercise of the rights to assemble and associate – and thus aids political plurality. 
One such means is that by privileging private communications, it facilitates 
unorthodox groups in organising.50 Further, by affording us the right to retain 
control over our private information, it can assist in securing rights of equal 
treatment by shrouding (certain) personal characteristics, publication of which – or 
in Rawlsian terms, lifting the veil of ignorance – might mean we suffer 
discrimination or differential treatment.51 
 
Closely linked to this is another socially-valuable outcome: innovative privacy, 
privacy here acting as the guarantor of, as Julie Cohen saw it, the freedom to 
tinker.52  
 
Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity from the efforts of 
commercial and government actors to render individuals and 
communities fixed, transparent, and predictable.53 
 
We need here to think of the work of Ruth Gavison54, and also of Edmund Kitch’s 
prospect theory in relation to intellectual property.55 It is not simply free speech 
that might be facilitated by an effective guarantee of privacy but experimentation, 																																																								50	On	which	see	E	Paton	Simpson	"Privacy	and	the	Reasonable	Paranoid:	the	Protection	of	Privacy	in	Public	Spaces"	50	(2000)	U	Toronto	LJ	305,	342	and	also	J	Bohman,	‘Expanding	dialogue:	The	Internet,	the	Public	Sphere	and	prospects	for	Transnational	Democracy’	in	N	Crossley	and	J	M	Roberts	(eds),	After	Habermas:	New	Perspectives	on	the	Public	Sphere	(Blackwell,	2004)	138.	I’m	grateful	to	Val	Swain	for	making	me	aware	of	this	latter	work.	51	The	rejoinder	is	that	it	does	not	in	fact	do	so,	but	instead	achieves	false	equality	based	on	a	public	lie.	True	equality	requires	equal	treatment	despite	public	disclosures.		52	Cohen	(n34)	1920.	53	Ibid	1905.	54	Gavison	(n8).	55	On	this,	see	B	Choi,	‘A	prospect	theory	of	privacy’	(2015)	51	Idaho	Law	Review	623	which	I	found	enormously	helpful.	
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human flourishing and social progress more widely and generally: privacy as 
catalytic, the ‘sponsor and guardian to the creative and subversive’. 56  The 
opportunity cost of allowing premature access to our ideas and thoughts is that 
they do not ever become fully fledged. Exposure leads to reticence – ‘public 
failures make us unlikely to try again.’57 The social, collective gain from others 
achieving their best – whether that be Steve Jobs or Lionel Messi – must be 
undeniable. As Gavison puts it, ‘I doubt that we could have many great pianists if 
individuals could practice only under the scrutiny of their not-always-sympathetic 
peers’.58 There are also clear links to what we earlier termed constitutive privacy. 
The dissonance and diversity that privacy protection is capable of heralding are 
essential conditions for socio-political change, advance and improvement:  
 
Liberal democratic citizenship requires a certain amount of 
discomfort - enough to motivate citizens to pursue improvements in 
the realization of political and social ideals. The modulated citizenry 
lacks the wherewithal and perhaps even the desire to practice this 
sort of citizenship.59  
 
Nearly fifty years ago, Charles Fried spoke of the moral capital that privacy 
creates. It is this that allows us to engage in what Valerie Steeves and Priscilla 
Regan have called ‘social negotiations’.60 Privacy avails us of both the choice and 
opportunity to ‘shar[e] information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which 
one does not share with all’.61 In doing so, it generates trust between individuals, 
the bedrock for ‘entering into the relations of voluntary reciprocal forbearance for 
mutual advantage’.62 There are echoes here of what we earlier termed co-optive 
privacy, but in this case situated not at the social macro level but at the micro 
level, and with a focus not on privacy as assurance but on privacy as protecting 
certain conduct. By allowing us to choose what items or information to make 																																																								56	T	Macklem,	Independence	of	Mind	(OUP	2007)	36.	57	Gavison	(n8)	448.	58	Ibid	461.	59	Cohen	 (n34),	 1918	 and	 see	 too	 H	 Nissenbaum,	 Privacy	 in	 Context:	 Technology,	 Policy,	 and	 the	
Integrity	of	Social	Life	(Stanford	University	Press	2009)	77.	60	V	Steeves	and	P	Regan,	 ‘Young	People	online	and	the	social	value	of	privacy’	(2014)	12	Journal	of	Information,	Communication	and	Ethics	in	Society	298,	304.	61	Fried	(n33).	62	Ibid	481.	
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public, and on what terms and to whom, privacy creates a form of currency – 
something which we might exchange with others to allow entry to different social 
groups, thus to kick-start and oil the wheels of shared endeavour.63 We might 
conceive of this as socialising privacy. David Feldman proposed that privacy 
helps foster ‘mutually dependent …purposeful co-operative activity’ 64  by 
controlling ‘access to social groupings to enable the participants to engage in 
communal activities which they regard as valuable’.65 Viewed in reverse, when 
free speech claims are used to legitimise publication to the world of certain 
material about us – material we would choose to keep to ourselves or would 
choose to release only to selected known friends – this compromises our ability to 
form social networks that are more expansive. The risk of embarrassment that 
comes from some minor youthful indiscretion or momentary lapse becoming more 
widely known save to those trusted few who already know may well prevent us 
making new friends or developing new relationships. Jane Bailey put it thus: such 
releases ‘might even be argued, in some cases, to interfere with the individual's 
ability to form relationships because of the rush to judgment that might occur as a 
result ...’.66 This brings in our earlier point about internet anonymity. Writing in the 
late 1940s, American sociologists William Moore and Melvin Tumin proposed the 
social value of ignorance. One insight chimes well here:  
 
Even the security of the individual may depend upon ignorance by 
others of personal attributes or past experiences that have no 
intrinsic bearing on his present status but which would be regarded 
unfavorably if known: for example, the technical Negro who is 
passing for white, the reformed ex-convict, the person below or 
																																																								63	On	 this	 though,	 see	 the	 contrary	 view	 expressed	 by	 Tugendhat	 J	 in	Goodwin	 v	NGN;	NGN	 v	VBN	[2011]	EWHC	1437	(QB)	[97]	‘The	first	thing	that	people	generally	want	to	know	about	one	another	is	the	relationships	of	each	other	with	one	another	and	with	other	people.	Each	person	wants	to	know	whether	 there	 is	 any	 common	 relationship,	 or	 any	 relationship	which	might	 preclude,	 or	 limit,	 the	development	 or	 continuation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 of	 them.	 The	 most	 important	information	 about	 an	 acquaintance	 or	 colleague	 is:	 are	 they	 friend	 or	 foe,	 trustworthy	 or	untrustworthy,	and	what	relationship	each	can	form	or	develop	with	the	other	(in	the	broadest	sense	of	those	terms).’	64	D	 Feldman,	 ‘Privacy-related	 Rights	 and	 their	 Social	 Value’	 in	 P	 Birks	 (ed),	 Privacy	 and	 Loyalty	(Clarendon	Press	1997)	22.	65	Ibid	24.	66	Bailey	 (n40)	279	albeit	 in	a	very	different	context,	 that	of	 the	privacy	claims	of	 those	 featured	 in	child	pornography.		
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above the required age for his position, the illegitimate child 
subsequently adopted.67  
 
The social benefit of A’s individual privacy in such a case is predicated on 
personal identity being something that is not inscribed and static but socially 
contextualised and reflexively interactive. I learn about myself from my 
interactions with others. A learns to develop, to mature and to change following 
those interactions – as in turn does B: ‘identity is formed through direct and 
mediated interaction with others’. 68  Thus, there is a shared interest in 
socialisation, something that a guarantee of limited release of information can 
help bring about. Of course, these exchanges of information – and the trust that 
flows – are not uniform. Privacy allows us to keep control of certain information 
from B, less from C, while allowing D to know an entirely different set of 
information about us. As James Rachels noted, these varied informational 
exchanges allow us to create differentiated relationships with others, as well as 
allowing us to confer different public statuses on ourselves: husband, employee, 
friend, football fan, school governor.69 This heterogeneity in turn has clear social 
utility in a liberal society, linked to the promotion of the good life. The downside, of 
course, is that deception is sanctioned – and that too comes at a social cost. We 
might make foolish judgements of others based on incomplete or partial 
information and there is a clear social value in such assessments being fully 
informed and thus reliable. If such be true, Neil Richards’s argument above that 
informational privacy might erode (meaningful) free speech and public discourse 
is made stronger. 
 
We considered above the normative role that a guarantee of privacy simpliciter 
might play in the social sphere, first constructing a distinction between the 																																																								67	W	Moore	and	M	Tumin,	 ‘Some	Social	Functions	of	Ignorance’	(1949)	14	Am	Soc	Review	787,	790.	On	one	aspect	of	that,	see	the	recent	exposure	of	white	Caucasian	woman	Rachel	Dolezale,	leader	of	the	NAACP	in	Washington	State,	who	had	lived	and	identified	for	many	years	as	black:	R	Péñrez-Peña,	‘Black	 or	 White?	 Woman’s	 Story	 Stirs	 Up	 a	 Furor’	 The	 New	 York	 Times	 12	 June	 2015	www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/rachel-dolezal-naacp-president-accused-of-lying-about-her-race.html	access	on	17	January	2017.	68	O	Gandy,		‘Exploring	Identity	and	Identification	in	Cyberspace’	14	(2000)	Notre	Dame	J	L	Ethics	and	Pub	Pol’y	1083,	1089	and	generally	A	Giddens,	Modernity	and	Self-Identity:	Self	and	Society	in	the	Late	
Modern	Age	(Stanford	University	Press	1994).	69	J	Rachels,	‘Why	Privacy	is	Important’	(1975)	4	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	323,	326.	
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personal and the public/political70 and then indicating where it might be sited.  
Where the protection that is offered shrouds specific private activities – such that 
we remain in control of which ones we choose to make public – then we can 
conceive of a further normative role for privacy-protection: norm-reinforcing 
privacy. The label of privacy is conferred on what are considered to be socially 
legitimate conduct and behaviours.71 Privacy protection rules therefore minimise 
the publicity given to deviance, ‘reinforcing the assumption that deviation from the 
rules is statistically insignificant’72, thus, the argument proceeds, reducing our 
individual propensity to deviance.	 There is a clear wider instrumentalism. 
Socialisation, and the strengthening of communal ties, is supported through what 
Moore and Tumin term the ‘induction of subservience’ of individual to group 
interests.73  While there is, it must be true, considerable social value in the 
production and reproduction of conformity, there is too social benefit from dissent. 
Neither per se is ‘good’. Cass Sunstein summed it up well: 
 
I do not suggest that dissent is always helpful. Certainly we do not need 
to encourage would-be dissenters who are speaking nonsense. The 
honor roll of famous dissenters includes Galileo, Martin Luther, Thomas 
Jefferson, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. 
But there is a dishonour roll of dissenters too including many of history’s 
monsters, such as Hitler, Lenin, defenders of American slavery, and 
Osama bin Laden. So defined, dissent cannot possibly be celebrated as 
such. Sometimes dissenters lead people in wrong directions.74 
 
That is made worse, as he explains later, by social cascading of conformity and 
by group polarisation whereby those with similar views reach or take more 
exacerbated positions, through reinforcement. 
 
																																																								70	Though	this	is	without	offering	a	view	on	the	legitimacy	of	such	a	divide.		71	A	Westin,	‘Social	and	Political	Dimensions	of	Privacy’	(2003)	59	J	Soc	Issues	431,	433	and	see	also	W	Warren	&	B	Laslett,	‘Privacy	and	secrecy:	a	conceptual	comparison’	(1977)	33	J	Soc	Issues	43,	44.	72	Moore	and	Tumin	(n67)	791.			73	Ibid	74	C	Sunstein,	Why	Societies	Need	Dissent	(Harvard	University	Press	2003)	7.	
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All this in turn posits a tension with one of the social functions of privacy that we 
identified earlier, innovative privacy. On one hand, the argument being made here 
is that privacy is ‘good’ because it reduces perceptions of deviance (and thus, it is 
argued, reduces deviance). Moore and Tumin put it well: ‘Traditional behavior 
depends in part upon ignorance of alternative.’75 On the other, it was argued 
earlier that privacy is ‘good’ because it promotes deviance, the lifeblood of social 
change.76 The tension might be resolved if we consider privacy to comprise both 
external and internal manifestations. What is not being suggested here is that 
blanket obedience to social norms is per se and always of social benefit, though 
often and selectively it will be (though nothing in this paper is offering judgement 
one way or another on specific norms). Its assertion is narrower. It is that privacy 
can contribute to both norm-reinforcement and norm-countering, each of which 
has the potential to be socially valuable.77 The tension appears to be put well 
through Daniel Solove’s observation about the sodomy laws in Georgian 
England.78 Instead of sowing the seeds for countering social norms, privacy rules 
in fact might operate in reverse. Privacy can (and indeed in his example, did) 
cloak norm-deviation, stunting social change. The development of blackmail laws 
in the 17th century – as he puts it, another means of securing privacy – is 
attributed to the need to deal with the growing number of people seeking to profit 
from their homosexual relationship with someone of social standing. The solution 
was not to repeal the law outlawing sodomy. On the specifics, he perhaps 
overplays his hand: there is probably little doubt that laws that prevent A from 
extorting money from B on pain of threat of revelation play a socially valuable 
role. Which has the greater social utility – that or equalising the law on sexual 
relationships – is an ethical question, of course. Gay men have been blackmailed 
in the UK since 1967 when the law was changed – so the legality of homosexual 
activity, rather than its (perceived) morality and acceptability might be less of an 																																																								75	Moore	and	Tumin	(n67)	791.	76	This	 is	 part	 of	 what	 Janis	 Goldie	 termed	 ‘expressive	 privacy’	 –	 protecting	 ‘people	 from	 the	overreaching	 social	 control	 of	 others	 that	would	 inhibit	 self-expression	 and	 freedom	of	 association	…[and]	from	the	pressures	to	conform	to	socially	accepted	viewpoints	or	practices’:	J	Goldie,	‘Virtual	Communities	 and	 the	 Social	 Dimension	 of	 Privacy’	 (2006)	 3	 U	 Ottawa	 L	 &	 Tech	 J	 133,	 139.	 She	considers	 it	primarily	as	of	value	for	an	 individual,	and	only	socially	and	 instrumentally	valuable	as	laying	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 ability	 to	 build	 social	 relations	 and	 thus	 for	 reflexive	 self-identity,	 an	aspect	of	what	is	termed	above	socialising	privacy.		77	A	point	also	made	by	Cass	Sunstein	–	but	one	which	he	takes	no	further:	Sunstein	(n74)	157-8.	78	D	Solove,	Understanding	Privacy	(Harvard	University	Press	2008)	95-96.	
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issue. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that some of the wider social effects of 
protecting individual privacy might not be gains, or there might be some 
ambivalence about their true social value. 
 
It is this internal/external distinction that explains the role Jed Rubenfeld attributes 
to privacy, that of mitigating against ‘insidious, thought-numbing 
standardization’.79 Julie Cohen praises the ‘behavioural variability’ that she claims 
is engendered but this is far likelier to be internal or contemplative rather than 
active and external. Without public ‘role’ models – the point we identified with 
Joseph Raz earlier – the norm-reinforcing, centripetal pull of privacy protection 
rules must be strong. That said, we can identify a further social value to privacy 
but not because it might have instrumental constitutive or dynamic value but more 
simply. This is the idea of eclectic privacy. We are surely likelier to live our lives 
more freely and to the full if we are guaranteed that whenever we do, this is not 
trumpeted from the rooftops by a newspaper? While that is an identifiable 
individual gain, there must also be a clear public interest in diversity and in 
heterogeneity. That we are able when we are younger to experiment – with ideas, 
with looks, with personas80 – is due to the security that individual privacy brings 
yet over time and aggregated this capacity for self-development brings about 
social gains too. This takes us to a further social value, drawing on Erving 
Goffman’s ideas about back stage behaviour, where we can relax.81 This is the 
notion of insulating privacy. Affording us the security that comes from knowing 
that private matters will not be published acts as a safety valve, allowing us an 
existence away from public pressures and public performance – avoiding the 
suffocating effects, as Solove refers to it, of being on constant possible display.82 
The compartmentalising that privacy brings means perfection is not always 
expected – we do not always have to be, or act or look our best.83 The relief this 																																																								79	J	Rubenfeld,	‘The	right	of	privacy’	(1989)	102	Harv	L	Rev	737,	785.	80	There	is	considerable	literature	on	the	self-developmental	aspects	of	privacy	for	teenagers	in	the	context	of	on-line	activity	at	least:	see	e.g.	S	Livingstone,	‘Mediating	the	public/private	boundary	at	home:	Children’s	use	of	the	internet	for	privacy	and	participation’	(2005)	6	Journal	of	Media	Practice	41	and	P	Regan	and	V	Steeves	above	(n60).	81	E	Goffman,	The	Presentation	of	Self	in	Everyday	Life	(Doubleday	Books	1959)	112.	82	D	Solove,		‘“I've	Got	Nothing	To	Hide”	And	Other	Misunderstandings	Of	Privacy’	(2007)	44	San	Diego	L.	Rev.	745,	762.		83	If	so,	then	the	notion	that	anyone	has	any	interest	in	how	I	look	when	I	pop	out	for	a	pint	of	milk	must	be	open	to	doubt;	c.f.	Baroness	Hale	in	Campbell		(n11)	[154].	
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ushers in allows each of us room and time to re-energise ourselves, something of 
clear value to us as individuals but with consequential social gains. Ruth Gavison 
wrote about how privacy ‘ameliorates tensions between social preferences and 
social norms’.84  This again promotes that necessary social heterogeneity by 
allowing us the freedom of multi-personas without feeling pressurised to conform, 
but goes further. It removes the attendant strain and so reduces the risk of social 
anomie and all that that might entail. Stephen Margulis sums it up thus: privacy ‘is 
posited to provide experiences that support normal psychological functioning, 
stable interpersonal relationships’.85 There are other psycho-social gains from 
realising the protection of private information. It removes the potential for 
alienating disjuncture – not simply the idea that ‘someone out there knows 
something about me,’ as Colin Bennett phrased it86, but that everyone out there 
now knows something about me which I would prefer them not to have known. 
 
We saw earlier, when we considered Solove’s ideas about blackmail, that 
protecting privacy might bring both social gains and social losses or at least there 
might be some ambivalence. This brings us to our last conceptualisation. To 
conclude this part of the article, we will turn now to another topic where, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, we might start to fashion a case for the social utility of privacy. 
Rather inelegantly we might convey this as coalescing privacy. This was to 
some degree informed by the discussion that surrounded the ‘unmasking’ of 
Italian author Elena Ferrante in 2016.87 Broadly, and in summary, this was that 
not only had she the right to privacy, to write anonymously, but that there was a 
wider interest – if not social, then of her many readers – to be able to continue 
reading her novels in ignorance of any personal details or backstory. This then is 
the idea that privacy-protection rules can contribute to public debate. First, the 
absence of any privileged knowledge, save that known to the person, creates a 
																																																								84	Gavison	(n8)	452.	85	S	Margulis,	‘Privacy	as	a	Social	Issue	and	Behavioral	Concept’	(2003)	59	J	Soc	Issues	243,	246.	86	C	 Bennett,	 Regulating	 Privacy	 Data	 Protection	 and	 Public	 Policy	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States	(Cornell	University	Press	1992)	28.	87	L	 Alexander,	 ‘Why	 is	 the	 exposure	 of	 Elena	 causing	 such	 outrage?’	 BBC	 News	 on-line	 5	 October	2016	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-37556183	access	on	17	January	2017	and	see	generally	J	Mullan,	Anonymity:	A	Secret	History	of	English	Literature	(Princeton	UP	2008).	We	might	also	think	of	the	police	officer	writing	as	Nightjack:	Author	of	a	Blog	v	Times	Newspapers	[2009]	EWHC	1358	QB.		
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level field for debate.88 Secondly, it means that we are able to exercise judgement 
on policies and issues, not clouded by or affected by distracting publications of 
private information (though of course if X remains a secret, we might all 
conjecture about ‘hidden’ facts A, B and C as well as X!).89 Being able to conceal 
true matters from public gaze – while obviously of (considerable) individual 
benefit, would not seem to have any social value, quite the opposite. Indeed, 
Richard Posner has compared privacy in this regard ‘to the efforts of sellers to 
conceal defects in their products’, such as an applicant to join the police 
concealing a history of mental illness.90 However, there might be gains. Even if 
the private information published is true, we will be left with a picture that is 
incomplete and skewed.91 Full publication of every fact and detail about each of 
us is neither practically possible nor morally desirable. Protecting privacy might 
reduce the chance that any one and each of us collectively will mischaracterise 
anyone else. This does not really produce the sort of social value we have been 
thinking about so far – this is ‘simply’ aggregative rather than independently 
social. Yet, drawing on the work of Paul Schwartz, we might do so.92 Schwartz 
looked to Timur Kuran and his identification of preference falsification: where A 
decides to present themselves as X or to take view Y based in turn on their 
falsely received understanding of some social phenomenon or fact.93 There is 
clearly a social gain from avoiding cumulative misconceptualisations and 
stereotyping – whether that be by government, business or others. Facilitating the 
forming of judgements and opinions and the basing of democratic discourse or 
public policy on partial, acontextualised information cannot be of benefit to any of 																																																								88	Though	on	this	see	Moore	and	Tumin	(n67)	788	–	that	ignorance	does	the	opposite:	‘The	function	of	ignorance	that	is	most	obvious,	particularly	to	the	cynical,	is	its	role	in	preserving	social	differentials’.	89	On	which,	Tugendhat	J	put	this	way	in	TSE	v	NewsGroup	[2011]	EWHC	1308	(QB)	[34]	‘But	there	is	another	 effect	 of	 NGN	 giving	 the	 details	 it	 did	 give	 about	 the	 Claimants.	 It	 thereby	 put	 the	 other	individuals	who	fitted	the	description	it	gave	in	the	article	under	suspicion	and	exposed	them	to	the	risk	of	 intrusion	 into	 their	private	 lives	 and	harassment.	This	 is	 a	 consequence	of	 the	way	The	Sun	chose	 to	 report	 the	 proceedings.	 It	 need	 not	 have	 been	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 claimants'	 action	 in	bringing	the	proceedings.’	In	Goodwin	(n63)	he	makes	this	observation:	‘If	a	person	does	not	wish	to	disclose	 an	 existing	 relationship,	 for	 whatever	 reason,	 there	 is	 a	 real	 risk	 that	 that	 will	 lead	 to	misunderstanding	or	deception’	([99]).	90	R	Posner,	‘The	Uncertain	Protection	of	Privacy	by	the	Supreme	Court’	(1979)	Sup	Ct	Rev	173,	174.	91	Though	of	course	privacy	protection	does	not	guarantee	impartiality	in	public	portrayals	about	any	of	us	–	it	simply	allows	us,	rather	than	a	third	party,	to	determine	the	skew	and	incompleteness.	92	Schwartz	“Internet	Privacy”	(n34)	840.	The	counter	is	that	public	debate	is	always	enhanced	by	full	disclosure	about	speakers’	identity	and	background	properly	to	allow	listeners	to	reach	an	informed	judgment	on	intention,	for	example.		93	T	 Kuran,	 Private	 Truth	 Public	 Lies	 (Harvard	 UP	 1995)	 and	 see	 generally	 J	 Rosen,	 The	Unwanted	
Gaze:	The	Destruction	Of	Privacy	In	America	(Random	House	2000).	
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us. As Schwartz put it, a guarantee of privacy ‘places restrictions on an ‘outing’ of 
knowledge and preferences that would be destructive to democratic 
community’.94 There is in fact a double whammy: not only does the absence of 
privacy protection encourage people to make false preferences but it favours 
certain (usually) elite groups who might be able to drive forward the publication 
and thus manipulate the agenda. Privacy protection minimises the opportunities 
for norm entrepreneurs – in our case, likely to be media institutions – from 
seeking improperly to shift the contours of public debate.95 All that said, whether 
or not it is of greater benefit to do so rather basing it on the absence of any 
information at all or only on information that we choose to release, the natural 
result of privacy-protecting laws, is clearly moot.  
 
This part has identified that there are manifold ways in which it can be argued that 
protecting my personal privacy – specifically ensuring that information about me 
is not published – has instrumental value to others. We now turn to consider how 
far any of those wider social rationales have been played out in the case law 
before the domestic courts. 
 
 
IV.  THE ROLE AND PLACE OF ‘THE SOCIAL’ AND ‘THE PUBLIC’ IN 
PRIVACY DOCTRINE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
In ‘Internet Privacy and the State’, Paul Schwartz offers the following insight on 
what earlier we termed the paradigmatic conception of privacy. It is one that  
 
… conceives of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one's data. 
I refer to this idea as ‘privacy-control.’ This liberal autonomy principle 
seeks to place the individual at the center of decision-making about 
personal information use. Privacy-control seeks to achieve informational 
self-determination through individual stewardship of personal data, and by 
keeping information isolated from access.96  																																																								94	Schwartz	(n34)	843.		95	Ibid,	841.	96	P	Schwartz,	‘Internet	Privacy’	(n34)	820.	
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In this part, we shall consider how far that notion of privacy-control dominates 
judicial discourse and whether or not there is evidence of ‘the public’, in its 
various guises, playing out in the courts – and if so, to what extent – in decided 
MOPI cases.  
 
A sample of the open judgments in 27 cases was selected.97 Westlaw listed 214 
UK cases under the search term privacy /10 media decided between 1 January 
1990 and 1 November 2016 (the date of the search), but only 45 if the search is 
narrowed to privacy /10 media /10 injunction.98 The former category includes 
cases that have nothing to do with MOPI injunctions against the press – such as 
(most recently at the time of writing) DB v General Medical Council concerning 
disclosure of an expert report in professional practice hearing. 99  The 
representative sample of 27 (60%) is then of a sufficient size as to allow 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn. The cases were not selected entirely at 
random. It includes first instance hearings as well as both privacy cases to have 																																																								
97	The	cases	were:	A	v	B	&	C	[2002]	EWCA	Civ	337,	[2003]	QB	195,	AAA	v	Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	554,	[2013]	WLR(D)	189,	AMM	v	HXW	[2010]	EWHC	2457	(QB),	Campbell	v	MGN	[2004]	UKHL	22,	[2004]	2	AC	457,	Carr	v	NewsGroup	[2005]	EWHC	971	(QB),	CTB	v	NewsGroup	[2011]	EWHC	1232	(QB),	Contostavlos	v	Mendahun	[2012]	EWHC	850	(QB),	DMK	v	NewsGroup	[2016]	EWHC	1646	(QB),	Douglas	v	Hello!	[2005]	EWCA	Civ	595,	[2006]	QB	125,	ETK	v	NewsGroup	[2011]	EWCA	Civ	439,	[2011]	WLR	1827,	Ferdinand	v	MGN	Ltd	[2011]	EWHC	2454	(QB),	Goodwin	v	
NewsGroup	[2011]	EWHC	1437	(QB)	(concerning	the	identity	and	position	of	Sir	Fred	Goodwin’s	lover	at	RBS),	Green	Corns	v	Claverly	Ltd	[2005]	EWHC	958	(QB),	Hutcheson	(KGM)	v	NewsGroup	[2011]	EWCA	Civ	808,	JPH	v	XYZ	[2015]	EWHC	2871	(QB),	Lord	Browne	of	Madingley	v	Associated	
Newspapers	Ltd	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	295,	[2008]	1	QB	103	and	the	High	Court	[2007]	EWHC	202	(QB),	
McKenitt	v	Ash	[2006]	EWCA	Civ	1714,	[2008]	QB	73,	Mills	v	NewsGroup	[2001]	EWHC	Ch	412,	Murray	
v	Big	Pictures	[2008]	EWCA	Civ	446,	[2009]	Ch	481,	PJS	v	NewsGroup	[2016]	EWCA	Civ	393	and	[2016]	UKSC	26,	[2016]	AC	1081,	Ntuli	v	Donald	[2010]	EWCA	Civ	1276,	[2011]	1	WLR	294,	Rocknroll	
v	NewsGroup	[2013]	EWHC	24	(Ch),	Spelman	v	Express	[2012]	EWHC	355	(QB),	T	v	BBC	[2007]	EWHC	1683	(QB),	John	Terry	(formerly	LNS)	v	Persons	Unknown	[2010]	EWHC	119	(QB),	Theakston	v	MGN	[2002]	EWHC	137	(QB),	Trimingham	v	Associated	Newspapers	Ltd	[2012]	EWHC		1296	(QB),	TSE	v	
NewsGroup	[2011]	EWHC	1308	(QB)	and	Weller	v	NewsGroup	[2015]	EWCA	Civ	1176,	[2016]	1	WLR	1541.	98	The	 decision	 to	 exclude	 the	 potential	 of	 Court	 of	 Protection	 cases	 was	 one	 that	 was	 taken	deliberately	although	there	is	evidence	of	the	wider	competing	interests	playing	out	in	doctrine:	see	for	example	M	v	Press	Association	[2016]	EWCOP	34	[34]	where	Hayden	J	said		‘The	challenge,	in	the	parallel	analysis	of	the	competing	rights	and	interests	in	play,	is	that	the	rights	in	contemplation	are	of	 wholly	 different	 complexion.	 The	 exercise	 involves	 the	 juxtaposition	 of	 the	 intensely	 personal	(grief,	 loss,	 privacy)	 alongside	 the	 conceptual	 (the	 public	 interest,	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 press,	 the	effective	dissemination	of	information,	the	administration	of	justice).	In	a	jurisdiction	where	there	is	a	human,	 and	 inevitable	 pull	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 vulnerable,	 (this	 is	 after	 all	 the	 Court	 of	Protection),	it	is	easy	to	overlook	how	some	of	the	wider,	abstract	concepts	also	protect	society	more	generally	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 embrace	 the	 vulnerable.’	 I	 am	 grateful	 to	 David	 Acheson	 for	making	me	aware	of	this	judgment.	99	[2016]	EWHC	2331	(QB).	
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reached the Supreme Court/House of Lords, Campbell and PJS, as well as 
appeals alongside looking at both first instance and appeal decisions in two, 
Murray and Lord Browne of Madingley. It ranges across interlocutory hearings – 
and appeals – pre-publication to hearings for damages after the event. It covers 
cases from the early days of the Human Rights Act 1998, Theakston and A v B & 
C (Gary Flitcroft), though the bulk are from about 2010. It therefore includes a few 
cases – including Mills – decided before Re S and the introduction of the new 
methodology recalibrating the balance between Articles 8 and 10. Several were 
chosen because the facts or individuals indicated a greater likelihood of judges 
addressing the wider social utility. Not all, though most, involved someone with a 
degree of fame or notoriety. Five were chosen at random from that Westlaw list: 
Carr, Mills, Spelman, T v BBC and TSE. 
 
The conclusions we can draw from that sample are that there is a near wholesale 
lack of judicial engagement with any underlying privacy or free speech or media 
theory – though that is probably not surprising. Do judges engage with theory in 
other areas of law… or indeed in other jurisdictions? Next, judicial accounts of 
possible rationales for protecting privacy are generally, indeed almost always, 
framed in individualistic terms. That said, some cases can be read or seen as – 
even if not explicitly reasoned – as using MOPI to protect or to serve wider social 
goals. Last, the only time there is any consideration of the public element in 
privacy cases is on the other side of the coin – that of freedom of expression – at 
the stage of the intense focus and ultimate balancing test. There is simply no 
sense in which the social utility of privacy has any traction in judicial reasoning, 
and thus in outcomes of instant cases. 
 
Examples of the individualistic conceptualisation of privacy abound, when we 
consider the sorts of harms that judges are keen to minimise or insulate against, 
or the good that judges seek to bring about. In Campbell, we read of the fact that 
protecting privacy serves to preserve personal autonomy, as well as obviating 
distress and the sense of betrayal.100 There are also the therapeutic gains to 
																																																								100	Campbell	(n97)	[50]	and	[35]	respectively.	
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Campbell herself.101 There was emotional and financial damage from disclosure 
at heart in JPH,102 as well as the massive affront to dignity in T v BBC, the 
planned film of the last meeting between a vulnerable 18 year-old mother with an 
IQ of 63 (and unable to give informed consent to the filming) and her baby before 
the latter was taken for adoption.103 Other general, personal health concerns 
feature in DMK104 and yet more strongly the very real ‘danger of serious physical 
and psychological harm’ in Carr, where Maxine Carr was seeking to restrain 
publication of any post-release personal details after serving her sentence for her 
role in two gruesome murders of young teenage girls.105 The driver to save or 
reduce embarrassment and upset, alongside security and safety concerns were 
to the fore in Weller106 and saving the children from a playground ordeal and 
bullying in ETK.107  Protecting an individual’s fair trial rights was effected in DMK 
by the refusal to allow publication of information or identity when there was a 
separate ongoing Chancery action against her former lover.108  Several cases 
have averred to the benefit that privacy brings in allowing us ordinary social 
interaction without also having to expect to see it reported in the press the next 
day.109 Last there is the whole sub-category of intimate relations and protecting 
sexual choice such as Ferdinand110, Goodwin and Lord Browne but not it seems 
sexual status or sexuality or even sexual stereotyping or information on the 
quality of sex that one has (Trimingham111) or indeed very fleeting or transitory 
sexual relationships (Theakston112). The courts have even protected information 
derived from or conduct relating to the commercial sphere, provided it can be said 
to meet the requirements of reasonable expectation of privacy.113 
 
																																																								101	Ibid	[95],	[119]	and	[145].	102	JPH	(n97)	[8].	103	T	v	BBC	(n97)	[16].	104	DMK	(n97)	[11].	105	Carr	(n97)	[4].	106	Weller	(n97)	[37]	and	[65].	107	ETK	(n97)	[17].	108	DMK	(n97)	[11].	109	In	 Lord	 Browne	 (n97)	 (High	 Court)	 [59]	 and	 Rocknroll	 (n97)	 [12]	 and	Murray	 (n97)(Court	 of	Appeal)	[55].	110	Ferdinand	(n97)	[56].	111	Trimingham	(n97).	112	Theakston	(n97).	113	Lord	Browne	(n97)	High	Court	[33]	–	[42].	
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Even where on the facts, protecting privacy might be seen to have wider social 
utility, these are rarely if ever adverted to. For example, there is not only a 
personal individual interest in having a fair trial – DMK – but a collective, social 
one, one that adverts (at very least) back to the idea of co-optive privacy that we 
identified earlier. If your privacy, or fair trial rights, is protected, that tells me that 
mine will be. It also has echoes of more socially constitutive concerns, that a fair 
trial is the bedrock of a society under the rule of law. In none of the countless 
privacy-of-relationships cases in the study was there even a nod to what we 
earlier termed co-operative privacy, that identified the functional role privacy plays 
in allowing us to establish and maintain social interaction, and thus flourishing 
both individual and collective. The only instance of judicial recognition of any 
wider attributes comes in Campbell when Baroness Hale locates her discussion 
of the social gains from protecting the confidentiality of therapeutic treatment in 
the context of the Strasbourg judgment in Z v Finland.114 As she puts it, 
 
Respecting the confidentiality of health data is …crucial not only to 
respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or 
her confidence in the medical profession and in the health services 
in general. Without such protection, those in need of medical 
assistance may be deterred from revealing such information of a 
personal and intimate nature as may be necessary in order to 
receive appropriate treatment and, even, from seeking such 
assistance, thereby endangering their own health and, in the case 
of transmissible diseases, that of the community.115 
 
Similarly, in Spelman – the young sports player who also happened to be the son 
of a (then) cabinet minister, there is a sense of an impending judicial discussion 
of what we earlier termed innovative privacy – specifically the need to practice, so 
																																																								114	Z	v	Finland	[1998]	25	EHRR	371.	115	Campbell	 (n97)[145].	 As	 just	 one	 example,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 HIV,	 Leary	 &	 Schreindorfer	 have	documented	the	 link	between	A’s	perception	of	 likely	stigmatisation	at	 the	release	of	his	HIV	status	and	 A	 revealing	 details	 of	 that	 status	 to	 others	 including	 potential	 partners:	 M	 Leary	 &	 L	Schreindorfer,	 ‘The	 stigmatization	 of	 HIV	 and	 AIDS:	 Rubbing	 salt	 in	 the	 wound’	 in	 V	 Derlega	 &	 A	Barbee	(eds),	HIV	&	social	interaction	(Sage	1998).	
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as to improve, away from the media spotlight – but any adverting to wider social 
utility is foreclosed; it is very clearly framed in terms of individual benefit: 
 
Participants in public sports and performing arts… reach the 
highest level by ascending from the lower levels. The restriction on 
what might otherwise be a reasonable expectation of privacy may 
well apply to those who aim for the highest level, even if they do 
not achieve it, or can no longer expect to achieve it.116 
 
By contrast, judicial explanations of the rationales for protecting free speech 
framed in both individual and social terms are many and several. We might 
highlight this one, again by Baroness Hale in Campbell: 
 
There are undoubtedly different types of speech, just as there are 
different types of private information, some of which are more 
deserving of protection in a democratic society than others. Top of the 
list is political speech. The free exchange of information and ideas on 
matters relevant to the organisation of the economic, social and 
political life of the country is crucial to any democracy. Without this, it 
can scarcely be called a democracy at all. This includes revealing 
information about public figures, especially those in elective office, 
which would otherwise be private but is relevant to their participation in 
public life. Intellectual and educational speech and expression are also 
important in a democracy, not least because they enable the 
development of individuals' potential to play a full part in society and in 
our democratic life. Artistic speech and expression is important for 
similar reasons, in fostering both individual originality and creativity 
and the free-thinking and dynamic society we so much value. No 
doubt there are other kinds of speech and expression for which similar 
claims can be made.117 
 
																																																								116	Spelman	(n97)	[70].	117	Ibid	[147].	
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While explicit judicial recognition of any of the various conceptualisations of 
privacy-protection as having social value or utility that we considered in Part IV 
was broadly non-existent in our study of 27 decisions, some cases can be read 
as using MOPI to protect or to serve more specific (but more narrowly tailored) 
social goals, even if they were not so clearly reasoned.118 Both AMM v HXW and 
CTB give considerable weight to the wider social interest in preventing and 
punishing blackmail (a matter also relevant in the granting of anonymity orders)119 
and the most obvious and sensible way to view JPH v XYZ is as preventing 
revenge porn. In Green Corns, there was a ‘strong public interest’ in the provision 
of secure care homes for troubled teenagers whether by the state or privately120 – 
justifying the ban on a local paper printing the likely location of where new ones 
would be sited. We might also note that judgment reflects the social interest – in 
capitalist society – in commercial organisations being able to make a profit. 
Judges do appear to have taken contrasting views of such an objective. We might 
here think of the reasoning in John Terry case. There, Tugendhat J made clear 
that ‘the real basis for [Terry’s] concern…is likely to be the impact of any adverse 
publicity upon the business of earning sponsorship and similar income.’ 121 
Another theme that runs through several cases relates to the stability of family 
life, for example in ETK v NewsGroup, alongside marriage reconciliation, and in 
Rocknroll maintaining and establishing caring relationships between children and 
(step) parents.122 Both Murray and Weller, while locating the right in the hands of 
the children themselves – on the facts, the young children of a famous parents – 
can be considered as acknowledging the wider and longer term social importance 
of appropriate child development. Lastly, Carr can be seen as providing (physical) 
security thus promoting rehabilitation of former prisoners after release – again, a 
																																																								118	I’m	indebted	to	Paul	Wragg	for	this	observation	and	initial	assistance.	119	Though	compare	SKA	&	PLM	v	CRH	 [2012]	EWHC	766	 (QB)	a	 case	where	an	alleged	blackmailer	sought	 to	 disclose	 a	 businessman’s	 adultery	with,	 and	 impregnation,	 of	 X	where	no	 injunction	was	granted.	Tugendhat	J	concluded	that	it	could	not	be	said	that	this	disclosure	about	the	claimant	(not	a	public	 figure	 so	 far	 as	 one	 can	 tell)	 should	 not	 be	 enjoined	 because,	 even	 if	 the	 defendant	were	 a	blackmailer,	to	do	so	would	deprive	him	of	his	Art	10	rights:	‘'to	tell	a	grown	up	child	that	his	or	her	father	.	.	.	is,	or	is	about	to	be,	the	father	of	twins,	is	speech	of	a	high	order	of	importance’	([79]).	120	Green	Corns	(n97)	[95].	121	Terry	(n97)	[95].	122	RocknRoll	(n97)	[36].	
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socially valuable aim being pursued through (here) a contra mundum 
injunction.123  
 
Perhaps the closest we ever get to an iteration of a more socialised function for 
the protection of individual privacy is the recognition of a ‘zone of interaction’ with 
others which we see in Strasbourg cases such as von Hannover No. 1124 and 
Sciacca125, and which has percolated into domestic law in Kinloch, JR38 and 
Wood. 126  ‘Article 8 is primarily intended to ensure the development without 
outside interference of the personality of each individual in his relations with other 
human beings.’ Clearly, this chimes with the socialising conceptualisation of 
privacy that we outlined earlier (p??) but does not go so far as to locate it within 
the social. It is very much portrayed as being of individual benefit rather than as 
your privacy being something in which I too might have a stake. There are echoes 
too perhaps of a more communitarian, Etzionian reading127, one that also takes 
issue with historic individualised focus of privacy but from a different perspective 
and one that reaches an alternative outcome. Individual privacy as currently 
conceived exempts certain acts from communal, governmental and public 
scrutiny, and thus privacy privileges individualism over shared or communal 
conceptions of the common good. This though still situates privacy as an 
individual right, but one that each or many of us has – rather than seeing it as one 
where I gain from your exercise of the right. It thus remains antagonistic with the 
public sphere, or as Solove puts it, an ‘individual indulgence at the expense of 
society’ – pitted against the common good rather than being part and parcel of 
it.128 
 
It will unlikely surprise many but the only time there is any consideration of the 
wider social or public value being contested in any privacy claim comes on the 
other side of the coin – that of freedom of expression – at the intense focus and 																																																								123	Carr	(n97).	124	von	Hannover	v	Germany	[2005]	40	EHRR	1	[50].	125	Sciacca	v	Italy	(2006)	43	EHRR	400	[29].	126	Kinloch	v	HM	Advocate	[2012]	UKSC	62,	[2013]	2	AC	93	[19],	In	Re	JR38	[2015]	UKSC	42,	[2016]	AC	1131	[100],	Wood	v	MPC	(n14)[21].	127	See	A	Etzioni,	‘A	Communitarian	Perspective	on	Privacy’	(2000)	32	Conn	L	Rev	897	and	generally 
The	Limits	of	Privacy	(Basic	Books	1999).		128	D	Solove,	Understanding	Privacy	(Harvard	University	Press	2008)	90.	
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ultimate balancing test. This will be well known to readers of this journal. In 
Campbell for example Lord Hope speaks of ‘the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression which the press assert on behalf of the public.’129 The broadcasting 
function of the press has judicial pedigree. It was key in the speech of Lord 
Bingham in McCartan Turkington Breen (on qualified privilege 130 ) and in 
GreenCorns, one of our study of 27 privacy cases, we are informed that ‘the 
principle is that the public's need to receive information is, and can only be, met 
through the medium of the press.’131 The judgment of Tugendhat J in John Terry 
even includes a heading ‘The Social Utility of the Threatened Speech’.132  
 
Familiar tropes here include whether or not there was a public interest in 
publication? What contribution will the publication make to a debate of public 
interest? In Ferdinand, Nicol J puts it this way 
 
Freedom of expression applies to banal and trivial expression as 
well as matters of public interest, but where that right has to be 
balanced against the rights of others to protect their privacy, the 
extent to which the content is of public interest or contributes to a 
debate of general interest assumes a much greater importance. 
Indeed, the contribution which the publication makes to a debate of 
general interest is the decisive factor in deciding where the balance 
falls between Article 8 and Article 10.133 
 
In Carr, for example, Eady J highlights two issues of legitimate public interest: the 
cost to the public purse of protecting and rehabilitating such a prisoner as Maxine 
Carr on release and any future lessons for child protection. However, as he 
continued, there was no need for her current whereabouts or her identity to be 
revealed for that debate to take place.134 Tugendhat J in Goodwin identified the 
public interest in ‘|the extent to which men in positions of power benefit from that 																																																								129	Campbell	(n97)	[115].	130	McCartan	Turkington	Breen	v	Times	Newspapers	[2000]	UKHL	57,	[2001]	2	AC	277.	131	GreenCorns	(n97)	[83].	132	John	 Terry	 (n97)	 between	 [96]	 and	 [97],	 and	 see	 similarly	 P	 Wragg,	 ‘The	 benefits	 of	 privacy-invading	expression’	(2013)	64	NILQ	187.	133	Ferdinand	(n97)	[62].	134	Carr	(n97)	[7].	
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power in forming relationships with sexual partners who are less senior within the 
same organisation’.135 There is also the judicial pre-eminence given to political 
‘public sphere’ speech, exemplified in ETK where there was ‘no political edge to 
the publication. The organisation of the economic, social and political life of the 
country, so crucial to democracy, is not enhanced by publication. The intellectual, 
artistic or personal development of members of society is not stunted by 
ignorance of the sexual frolics of figures known to the public.’136 
 
Another theme is the public watchdog role of the press: those with the ‘greatest 
need for this constitutionally vital freedom [of freedom of expression] are the 
organs of the media. In the interests of our democratic society we – and that 
includes the judges – must ensure that the press is freely able to enquire, 
investigate and report on matters of public interest.’137 From here, of course, it is 
but one small step to seeking to realise the public interest in the continued 
existence of a viable free press by limiting those encumbrances on its ability 
freely to report, and thus to achieve sales. Such thinking seems now to have a 
firm purchase. One of Lord Woolf’s guidelines in A v B & C in the Court of Appeal 
asserted that the courts ‘must not ignore the fact that if newspapers do not 
publish information which the public are interested in, there will be fewer 
newspapers published, which will not be in the public interest’.138 In Campbell 
Lord Hoffman acknowledges that ‘we value the freedom of the press but the 
press is a commercial enterprise and can flourish only by selling newspapers.’139 
Most recently, in ETK, this was framed by Ward LJ thus: 
 
To restrict publication simply to save the blushes of the famous, fame 
invariably being ephemeral, could have the wholly undesirable 
chilling effect on the necessary ability of publishers to sell their 
newspapers. We have to enable sales if we want to keep our 
newspapers. Unduly to fetter their freedom to report as editors judge 
																																																								135	Goodwin	(n97)	[103].	136	ETK	(n97)	[21].	137	ETK	(n97)	[13].	138	A	v	B	&	C	(n97)	[11](xii).	139	Campbell	(n97)[77]	
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to be responsible is to undermine the pre-eminence of the deserved 
place of the press as a powerful pillar of democracy.140 
 
We might here recall that Prosser attributed as a key factor in Samuel Warren’s 
decision to co-author that seminal piece the press intrusion into the wedding of 
his daughter.141 The original complaint of Brandeis and Warren in 1890 was that 
gossip was no longer 
 
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, 
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery…In this, as in 
other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each 
crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, 
and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in the lowering of 
social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, 
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both 
belittles and perverts.142 
 
More recently, it was put thus by Gavin Phillipson: 
 
if the courts are able, through development of effective privacy rights, 
to discourage newspapers from publishing the kind of intimate gossip 
with which both these cases were concerned, then the result may 
well be a greater concentration in the media upon serious stories, 
including discussion of matters of real political and social 
importance.143 
 
																																																								140	ETK	 (n97)[13]	 and	 see	 the	 acceptance	 by	 Dingemans	 J	 in	 the	 High	 Court	 (Weller	 v	 Associated	
Newspapers	Ltd	[2014]	EWHC	1163	(QB)	[147]-[149])	of	the	Daily	Mail’s	case	that	show	business	or	celebrity	stories	were	popular	and	 ‘generated	revenue	through	digital	advertising	spend	which	was	critical	 to	 Mail	 Online's	 commercial	 model.	 A	 profitable	 news	 website	 allowed	 for	 freedom	 in	journalism.’	141	W	Prosser,	‘Privacy’	(1960)	48	Calif	L	Rev	383.	142	Warren	and	Brandeis	(n10)	196.	143	G	 Phillipson	 ‘Judicial	 reasoning	 in	 breach	 of	 confidence	 cases	 under	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Act:	 not	taking	privacy	seriously?’	(2003)	EHRLR	Supp	(Special	issue:	privacy)	54,	66.	
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Yet would this really be so? As Lior Strahilewitz phrased it, ‘news and gossip are 
not close substitutes. If the courts were to shut down TMZ.com, its readers would 
not suddenly flock to the Boston Review.’144 
 
Judicial pronouncements illuminate yet further aspects of the public interest. The 
public interest in the freedom to criticise and generate debate on ‘socially harmful’ 
conduct’ was noted by Tugendhat J in John Terry, and had led, he continued by 
way of illustrative example, to such recent social changes as the rules on insider 
dealing and proscribing art sales from archaeological sites.145 There is long-
standing public interest in exposing hypocrisy or public being misled, that we see 
at the heart of Ferdinand or Campbell, and reflected in the PCC code. In 
Spelman, there is acceptance that the welfare of children and young people was 
a matter fit for public discussion, leading to the discharge of an injunction that had 
prevented publication of a story framed by the newspaper as being about the 
risks that those responsible for organising national and international sporting 
activities might have interests that conflicted with the welfare of the children 
involved146 – specifically as it turned out, in relation to performance-enhancing 
drugs. In T v BBC, the public interest addressed was that of adoption and 
childcare, in the context (specifically) of young, vulnerable mothers of low 
intelligence.147 Two cases advert to wider commercial or regulatory concerns that 
might not have come to light had an injunction been granted. The High Court in 
Lord Browne recognised that maintaining the proper corporate role of the board 
and shareholders in holding directors accountable (here, for alleged misuse of 
BP’s resources and manpower to support or assist his partner) was a legitimate 
social aim. In Goodwin, a legitimate interest in corporate governance, specifically 
a breach of the RBS Code of Conduct (on conflicts of interest at work) was raised 
– but then abandoned – by The Sun before the High Court, arguing for 
publication. We might even note, and in stark contrast to the thesis being 																																																								144	L	Strahilewitz,	(n143)	2016.	145	John	Terry	 (n97)[100]-[104].	He	made	a	 similar	point	 in	Goodwin	 (n97)[133]:	 ‘It	 is	 in	 the	public	interest	 that	 newspapers	 should	 be	 able	 to	 report	 upon	 cases	 which	 raise	 a	 question	 as	 to	 what	should	or	should	not	be	a	standard	in	public	life.	The	law,	and	standards	in	public	life,	must	develop	to	meet	changing	needs.	The	public	interest	cannot	be	confined	to	exposing	matters	which	are	improper	only	by	existing	standards	and	laws,	and	not	by	standards	as	they	ought	to	be,	or	which	people	can	reasonably	contend	that	they	ought	to	be.’	146	Spelman	(n97)	[107].	147	T	v	BBC	(n97)	[17].	
	 34	
advocated in this article, the courts accepting the public interest in spurned lovers 
being able to exercise their personal autonomy and self-development by a tell-
tale story.148 
 
Other discussions of the public side of individual personal privacy traverse well-
known ground: was the information obtained in a public place, emphasising the 
historic spatial skew towards private life? Was the information already in the 
public domain? Was the subject a public figure?149 As to the first, the location is 
becoming less pivotal as the courts move towards conceptualising the essence of 
the activity as the greater factor, such as the family outing in public in Weller.150 
We have seen too, a loosening of approach on the question of prior publication, 
as the courts have moved towards framing claims as intrusions, in a MOPI claim, 
than when claims were based on confidentiality. It is now possible to intrude onto 
privacy repeatedly such that the public domain is no longer the simple on/off 
switch it once was. We see this in cases such as PJS (in the Supreme Court), in 
Rocknroll and in GreenCorns.  For example in the last named, the Court decided 
that republication of existing material was capable of having a significant effect 
especially if it involved the collation of information such as to make it in effect 
‘new’ information (addresses of properties in Land Register together with what 
business was being carried meant new information about the likely use of the 
properties in relation to troubled children).151 We glean another insight into the 
possible lessening of existing publication in Ferdinand, where the Court was 
prepared to accept that earlier articles and interviews with the footballer did not 
constitute sufficient voluntary disclosure of this relationship as later to deny him a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.152 Goodwin provides an interesting example of 
the public figure debate. There, Tugendhat J distinguished on the one hand 																																																								148	Ntuli	v	Donald	(n97)[22]-[23].	149	See	 for	 example	 in	 RocknRoll	 (n97)[14]-[15]	 the	 Court’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 paper’s	 claim	 that	 the	claimant	was	a	public	figure,	attributable	solely	through	marriage	to	the	actress	Kate	Winslet	and	to	his	 connection	 to	 his	 uncle,	 Richard	 Branson,	 albeit	 that	 he	 was	 simply	 a	 middle	 manager	 in	 his	uncle’s	private	business.		150	See	Weller	(n97)[61]:	This	was	a	‘private	family	outing.	It	could	have	been	a	family	visit	to	a	local	park	or	to	a	public	swimming	pool.	It	happened	to	be	an	outing	to	the	shops	and	to	a	café	which	was	visible	from	the	street.	The	essential	point	is	that	it	was	a	family	activity	which	belongs	to	that	part	of	life	which	 is	protected	by	the	broader	right	of	personal	autonomy	recognised	 in	the	case	 law	of	 the	Strasbourg	court…’	151	GreenCorns	(n97)[81].	152	Ferdinand	(n97)[58]-[59].	
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celebrities and sports players from, as here, the ‘Chief Executive of one the 
largest publicly quoted companies in the United Kingdom, doing business on a 
global scale. Whatever limits there may be to the legal concept of a public figure, 
or of a person carrying out official functions, in my judgment Sir Fred Goodwin 
came within the definition.’153 Whereas, in the High Court’s view, Ned RocknRoll 
did not come within the category, something the newspaper had claimed 
attributable solely through marriage to the actress Kate Winslet and his 
connection to his uncle, Richard Branson, albeit that he was simply a middle 
manager in his uncle’s private business.154 
 
 
V.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
Inevitably, there are further obstacles that would require surmounting were 
privacy law to develop along lines suggested above – acknowledging that the 
potential harm is not just to one, but to us all.155 This last part posits a few of 
those tensions and concerns, and offers some tentative solutions and concluding 
thoughts.  
 
Why does all this matter? I think there are two reasons. The first is a conceptual 
one. If we are to have newspaper outings of, taking a recent example, MPs such 
as Keith Vaz, we should be sure the analytical framework is responsive to all the 
variables, not just to some or, as I would argue, to all of those on one side 
(freedom of expression) but only to a sample on the other. Secondly, at a 
practical level, it matters how cases are argued and resolved and who might 
claim the benefit of any remedy. Let us take those in turn. 
 
At a conceptual level, if we conceive of privacy as offering wider social utility 
rather than simply as something of individual value, we can better appreciate that 
the judicial and policy approach – of private gain against public benefit of free 
speech – creates a false dichotomy. Ian Leigh and Lawrence Lustgarten wrote 																																																								153	Goodwin	(n97)[103].	154	RocknRoll	(n97)[14]-[15].	155	For	greater	expansion	and	explication,	see	D	Solove,	‘The	Meaning	and	Value	of	Privacy’	in	Roessler	and	Mokrokinska	(n3)	78-80.	
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about the balance between rights and security in the 1980s and Daniel Solove 
adopted it in the more specific context of digital privacy and security nearly twenty 
years later.156 Rather than being in oppositional tension, protecting privacy may in 
fact sustain the same sorts of goals that securing protection for free speech might 
also serve. We see this most obviously when we considered claims to intellectual 
privacy, to innovative privacy and to facilitative privacy, but insulating privacy 
allows us to relax before immersing ourselves once more in the public sphere, 
while coalescing privacy, it was argued above, provides the level playing field 
necessary for public debate. Viewing the potential harm as connoting something 
more collective requires the construction of a very different utilitarian calculus. In 
short, and perhaps counter-intuitively, failing to see that on occasion securing an 
individual’s privacy (that is, not allowing unrestrained publication about 
someone’s private life) might not also lead to a flourishing, rather than a 
diminution, of free speech constitutes a category error. Privacy and free speech, 
or elements of each at least, can in fact be the same sides of the coin. 
 
A couple of points flow from that new analytical approach.	 If privacy is no longer 
solely an individual but also a social or collective good, does this mean A is or 
even should be able to waive it? As Jane Bailey put it, in the context of on-line 
privacy, especially those victims/subjects of child pornography  
 
if privacy is, or is becoming, a collective or public good, the 
weaknesses of policy solutions that establish a property right in 
personal information or that allow one to waive one's privacy rights 
also would become clear. If one individual or a group of individuals 
waives privacy rights, the level of privacy for all individuals 
decreases because the value of privacy decreases157  
 
There are two limbs to this. If A really is not bothered by any loss of privacy, what 
could found B, C and D’s collective right to be aggrieved? In Part III, we 
considered the various social claims that can be made on their behalf. Broadly, 																																																								156	I	Leigh	and	L	Lustgarten,	 In	From	the	Cold:	National	Security	and	Parliamentary	Democracy	(OUP	1994)	and	D	Solove,	Nothing	to	Hide:	The	False	Tradeoff	Between	Privacy	and	Security		(Yale	UP	2011).		157	Bailey	(n40)	293.	
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even if A feels she has suffered no harm, a strong case can be made that not 
only are B, C and D impoverished but we all are, or at least there is the potential 
for us all to be. Put thus, it is not A’s right, or not A’s right alone, to waive. That 
thought does not assist in resolving the other difficulty – how can we give 
practical effect to that collective assertion of harm, especially in the face of A’s 
consent or intransigence? One practical response in the UK setting would be the 
adjustment of regulatory rules requiring only the affected individual to mount a 
claim. IPSO requires, for complaints about anything other than accuracy in the 
Editors’ Code, a person to be ‘directly affected’. IMPRESS similarly requires 
someone to have been personally affected other than for complaints about 
accuracy where it permits third party complaints. This provides, at best, only a 
very partial solution. It is one thing to confer standing on third parties and quite 
another to craft a remedy that adequately responds to those collective, mutual 
interests.158 The following (rather inelegantly drafted) sample correction avails a 
flavour of that might be conveyed159  
On 1 January, we published an item indicating that A had done X [in 
circumstances Y]. While A did not contact us to complain, The Daily 
News acknowledges that in publishing that item, we acted 
improperly. That item might have led many others to believe that 
doing X [in circumstances Y] was a proper subject for a newspaper 
to report on. In doing so, we may have dissuaded others from doing 
or even from trying to do X. The Daily News accepts that doing X is 
or has the potential to be a socially useful activity, contributing to [β 
and δ160] and thus has long term or wider benefits for us all. 
 
Remaining with our conceptual strand, James Nehf identifies two further issues 
that flow from framing privacy as implicating only individualised utility. First, those 
not affected, or rather those perceiving themselves as not being affected, may 
disengage from the debate. This is, as Solove points out, a general response in 
																																																								158	I	am	grateful	to	the	reviewer	for	raising	this.	I	confess	I	do	not	have	an	adequate	response.	159	It	is	premised	and	thus	worded	to	reflect	the	socially	valuable	instrumentality	of	protecting	specific	activities.	A	differently	worded	construction	would	be	needed	to	reflect	the	idea	of	privacy	as	effecting	assurance.		160	β	and	δ	would	correspond	to	some	or	all	of	the	various	socially	beneficially	outcomes	in	Part	III,	such	as	innovation,	norm-reinforcement	or	eclecticism.	
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the surveillance and security debate – I’ve got nothing to hide, so what’s the 
problem?161 Additionally, and this flows from its non-absolute nature requiring 
privacy to compete with other rights and social interests, he notes that  ‘the 
influence of interest group politics could not be overcome.’162 He adverts to the 
changed frame within which we now debate environmental harms – as something 
that now no longer effects simply the neighbour onto whose land waste spills but 
as a general societal problem calling for a public collective regulatory 
response.163  
 
If we turn back to the practical realisation of our expanded notion of privacy, Part 
IV showed that there was no evidence of wider social utility in court judgments 
(though the survey has not so far considered how cases were presented and 
argued by counsel). It is impossible to determine if appeals to social utility would 
have affected the outcome in any one case. It would be easy enough to locate 
claims to a more socially responsive conception of privacy within the current 
doctrinal framework. Even given the very clear contextual steer in Murray by the 
Master of the Rolls164 (and endorsed by the Supreme Court in In re JR 38165), the 
first stage, – whether or not there was a reasonable expectation – while objective, 
has as its focus the effect on the claimant, not the effect on wider society. Nothing 
though would seem to prevent it being argued at the second stage of the ultimate 
balancing test that it is not simply the comparative importance to the claimant that 
should be on one side of the equation but the social good that protecting privacy 
could effect or would be capable of effecting.  
 
While the appropriateness of the balancing test is contested at a normative level, 
primarily because of the difficulty, indeed inherent impossibility, of attributing 
value to and then weighing against each other two things that are both 
immeasurable and incommensurable, this paper takes as a given its continued 
traction.166  This is not the place to rehearse, let alone resolve that argument. 																																																								161	Solove	Nothing	to	Hide	(n156).	162	J	Nehf,	‘Recognizing	the	societal	value	in	information	privacy’	(2003)	78	Wash	L	Rev	1,	72-73	163	Ibid	74.	164	Murray	(n97)	[36]	165		In	re	JR	38	(n126)	[88]	(Lord	Toulson).	166	On	which,	as	one	recent	example,	see	P	Wragg,	‘Protecting	private	information	of	public	interest:	
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That said, while re-framing privacy, in collective terms, would complicate that 
balancing exercise, by pairing public interest expression with of public interest 
privacy, we might explore this a little more before ending.167  While, clearly, it 
would be impossible to prove or even quantify the social utility of preventing a 
particular privacy-invading publication, that should not matter. The claim that a 
free press contributes to democratic self-governance has never been put to proof; 
its truth has now simply been asserted so long and so vociferously that it is self-
evident – judicial notice is simply taken of this now undisputed fact.168 Further, it 
is not being asserted that all invasions of A’s privacy would implicate a more 
collective notion of privacy. This though is, or should be true, for free speech (on 
the other side of the equation) – not all speech goes to enhancing democracy or 
offering different versions of truth in the market place for acceptance or rejection; 
it is hard to see how tittle tattle can ever do so.169 Our more socialised conception 
of privacy entails rejection of the monolithicism of free speech and, now, of 
privacy and calls for a more nuanced judicial analysis of both sides, evaluating 
more precisely the exact harms alleged to be suffered if the material is (not) 
published. Of course, to repeat the point made above, what we dealing with on 
the privacy side is more likely an inchoate harm but this is likely as true of many 
claims made about the collective harms, or gains, of free speech.  
 
In all this, it would be critical properly to frame the various interests at play and in 
tension. This might be the wider social utility or the countervailing public interest. 
Tugendhat J was alert to the difficulties in GreenCorns.170 There, the issue – to 
remind ourselves – was whether or not to restrain a local paper publishing certain 
details of a planned children’s care home. He accepted that there was no public 
interest properly defined at all in publishing the information that was subject to 
restraint.171 The public interest was in how (perhaps by whom) the children were 
to be cared for. That was not the material the paper sought to publish, which was 																																																																																																																																																																						Campbell’s	great	promise,	unfulfilled’	(2016)	7	JML	225.	167	The	discussion	here	was	prompted	by	a	reviewer	comment,	for	which	I	am	grateful.	168	Although	on	this	see	the	recent	Court	of	Protection	judgment	of	Charles	J	in	Re	C	(Deceased)	[2016]	EWCOP	21	especially	[158]-[166].	Again,	I’m	grateful	to	David	Acheson	for	this.	169	Though	on	which	see	P	Wragg,	‘The	benefits	of	privacy-invading	expression’	(2013)	64	NILQ	187,	194.	170	GreenCorns	(n97).	171	Ibid	[99].	
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the location of the home. Essentially, what was being set up in opposition, he 
continued, was a series of private interests in, for example, house values which 
the paper sought to aggregate and to be wrapped up collectively as a public 
interest.172  
 
In conclusion, one matter should be made clear. This paper is not arguing that 
privacy should always or even invariably trump free speech: we should not 
always have a right to know about the love child of a leading politician. There will 
quite properly be times – many and frequent perhaps – as a matter both of plain 
doctrine and of policy and theory – when the interest in protecting someone’s 
privacy is outweighed by the greater interest in publication, even where there 
might also be some consequent social or collective (future) loss if the private facts 
become publicly known. It is making the much simpler point. That it is time we 
reconceptualised privacy and its instrumental possibilities, and thus reconfigured 
the balancing matrix, avoiding (in footballing terms) free speech always being the 
team able to play at home.173	
 
 
																																																								172	This	goes	to	an	earlier	discussion:	that	there	is	a	difference	between	a	common	or	collective	public	interest,	in	Regan’s	terms	(above	n2),	and	aggregative	or	cumulative	private	interests.	173	Mead	(n41)	549.	
